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Analysis: 
The news did not exactly hit the media front pages, but none the less it is worth 
noticing, that the work has started. From the point of view of the EU, the MPs should 
be understood as a tool for the EU’s ‘Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’ 
(GAMM; the official and common EU policy concerning migration) and the EU has 
since 2007 been trying to negotiate and implement so-called Mobility Partnerships 
(MPs) with countries south of the Mediterranean and in the Caucasian region. Since 
2007 MPs have been signed in the Caucasian region with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cape 
Verde, Georgia and  Moldova, in the Mediterranean region – as mentioned – with 
Morocco and Tunisia. 
The MP with Tunisia was signed 3 March 2014, following the signing of a similar 
agreement with Morocco in June 2013. Besides these two agreements negotiations on 
MPs take place with Jordan. Egypt has twice refused to enter negotiations and 
regarding other Arab states negotiations haven’t started. It has been claimed that the 
MP-agreements are unbalanced and not seen as particularly attractive by the Arab 
partners. Furthermore it seems that Morocco and Tunisia both only reluctantly have 
accepted the MPs, more or less as a result of economic and political pressure from the 
EU. 
Given the EU’s well-known preoccupation with security in the context of 
migration there is hardly any doubt, that the Arab uprisings from early 2011 were 
followed very closely by the European political leaders. The dramatic and unforeseen 
developments in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen did, seen from the European 
side of the Mediterranean, represent interesting new perspectives and challenges, 
which might lead to democratic progress in a conservative and static Middle Eastern 
region. But they also represented a potential threat related to migration, if the changing 
realities in one or several of the Middle Eastern countries went out of control and led to 
large scale population movements, refugee crisis situations etc., as it has been the case 
in Libya during the fighting against Qadhafi and in Syria the last three years. 
Taking the joint declaration, establishing a Mobility Partnership between 
Morocco and the EU, as a point of departure, three different types of migration related 
issues can be identified. The first type is related to legal migration, issuing of visas etc. 
It is noticeable, that the wording of this section is relatively positive, aiming at making 
things work. Under the heading “Mobility, legal immigration and integration” the 
common interest in ensuring “more fluid mobility between the EU and Morocco” is 
mentioned. Furthermore an ambition of making it easier for “Moroccan vocational 
trainees, students, academics, researchers and businessmen and women to enter and 
stay in the EU member states” is brought forward (EU-Council, 2013: 5). 
The next section deals with combating illegal migration, people-smuggling and 
border management. The commonality of interests between the signatories is 
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emphasized by referring to “the mutual benefit of both parties and in compliance with 
the existing reciprocal obligations between Morocco and the EU Member States” (EU-
Council, 2013: 6). A keyword in this section is readmission, especially related to third-
country nationals. Furthermore this part of the document focuses on support for 
Moroccan efforts in order to prevent and combat illegal migration, trafficking, 
smuggling of illegal migrants and cross-border crime. 
The third issue is related to refugees and irregular migration – again with 
obvious security dimensions. Under the heading “International protection” it is 
mentioned that the agreement aims at “strengthening of the Moroccan legislative and 
institutional framework for asylum (...) close cooperation with the relevant agencies 
and bodies of the EU and its Member States, and with the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees” (EU-Council, 2013: 9). Different aspects of irregular migration are mentioned 
in the documents, as are the institutional means with which the EU intends to secure 
the implementation of the partnership: Frontex, Europol, CEPOL, Eurojust, EASO and 
the EFT.1 
 
The Mobility Partnerships and Mediterranean Migration 
In the following section the situation concerning MPs in Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco 
and Tunisia will be described and analyzed. A recent status is presented in order to 
discuss how we got there and to point to possible scenarios for the coming years 
concerning MP agreements with the specific countries. The general impression is that 
the MPs, seen from the perspective of the southern partnership countries, represent a 
“strong insecurity- and control-oriented approach while allowing only restricted, 
temporary, and highly selective forms of immigration into the Union” (Carrera et al., 
2013 ). The MPs are “driven by a strong conditionality by requiring third states to 
adopt and show strong commitment to the European security policy on mobility as 
irregular immigration and, in particular, by concluding readmission agreements with 
the EU” (Carrera et al., 2013 ). Definitely the realities concerning the MPs are not the 
same in the five countries as it can be seen below. 
 
Egypt: Stalemate due to Continued Turmoil 
The Swedish European Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström wrote 17 
April 2012 on her blog that for “over a year now I’ve been trying to get the Egyptians 
interested in a Mobility Partnership where we discuss migration, asylum, visa issues, 
etc. in a broad sense (...) From Egypt’s side, it has so far been turned down. We’ll see 
what happens after the presidential elections in June” (Malmström, 2012). More than 
two years later (June 2014) it seems that nothing has happened regarding the MPs in an 
Egyptian context. Egypt is – regarding migration – the largest migration country of the 
five countries in focus here. It is first of all a country, which delivers man power to its 
neighbours (Jordan, Libanon, Libya), but also the Arab Gulf states receive a significant 
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number of Egyptian work migrants. Added to that Egypt receives huge amounts of 
migrants and refugees coming from the south (Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, 
etc.), as documented by the CARIM MPC-Team report on Egypt (MPC-Team, 2013). 
The migration from the south does not, regarding numbers, amount to much compared 
with the number of Egyptians leaving as work migrants to other countries in the 
MENA-region, the EU and the US, but the character of the specific migration with 
Egypt as receiving country is very differentiated, partly illegal and completely 
uncontrolled. 
The main stock of refugees staying in Egypt are Palestinians,”followed by 
Sudanese, Somali and Ethiopian nationals, who mainly arrived in the 1990s as a result 
of civil wars and political instability in the Horn of Africa” (MPC-Team, 2013: 7). In a 
security context and therefore of relevance in connection with a possible future 
cooperation on preventing refugees from reaching Egypt as well as Europe it should be 
mentioned, that migrants from south of the Sahara to an increasing degree are passing 
through Egypt (as it takes place through Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco) in order 
– via the so-called eastern Mediterranean migration route - to try to get to Europe. 
It is difficult to find out what has kept the Egyptians from accepting to start 
negotiations about the MPs. Informal interviews with EEAS-officials from Cairo imply, 
that the reason was the turmoil in itself, in the sense that the Egyptians did not want to 
negotiate with the EU as long as the political situation in Egypt was unclear.2 This, of 
course, is a rather neutral and diplomatic description of what might have had other, 
more substantial, reasons. In a EU-Commission Memo of 27 March 2014 it is reiterated, 
that in 2011 “Egypt declined the offer made by the EU to start a Dialogue on Mobility, 
Migration and Security, leading towards the conclusion of a Mobility Partnership” 
(EU-Commission, 2014e), which is an indication that negotiations are not ongoing. 
The result of this situation is, that the agreements between the EU and Egypt 
concerning migration are vague and to some degree preliminary, based as they are, on 
the EU-Egypt ENP Action Plan of March 2007. Here it says regarding border 
management cooperation, that the EU and Egypt “should initiate appropriate technical 
contacts with FRONTEX”, regarding legal and illegal migration they should “develop 
a comprehensive and balanced dialogue” and in relation to combating illegal migration 
into Egypt and the EU should exchange “information and experiences on migratory 
movements, illegal migration including the scale of illegal immigration into and via 
Egypt (...) prevent and counter illegal migration into Egypt and the European Union” 
(EU-Commission, 2007: 29). 
The elections in Egypt in 2011 and 2012, bringing the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Mohammad Mursi to power, did not lead to a stable and well-functioning political 
leadership. The long period up the election of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in May-June 2014 
has been a deeply problematic period for Egypt and there is hardly any doubt that 
there is interconnectedness between the chaotic political development in Egypt since 
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the fall of Husni Mubarak and the fact that MP negotiations between the EU and Egypt 
never started. 
 
Jordan – Pragmatic Mobility Partnership Talks 
Despite the fact that few Jordanians have migrated to Europe and that Jordan, contrary 
to the Arab Mediterranean states, only to a limited degree functions as a transit country 
for illegal migration and refugees heading for Europe, the EU and Jordan in December 
2012 launched a “dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security” (EU-Commission, 
2014d). According to the European Commission the EU and Jordan have decided to 
open negotiations for an MP, including readmission and visa facilitation agreements. 
Two expert missions were carried out in February and July 2013 and it is worth 
mentioning that important security issues were discussed. Not only questions related 
to work migration and mobility, but also security related issues such as “international 
protection, border management, travel and identity document security and the fight 
against organised crime and terrorism” (EU-Commission, 2014d). 
The regime in Jordan and the EU have significant commonalities of interest 
related to radicalism and terror in the Middle East and it seems obvious that the EU 
supports the Hashemite Kingdom in Amman and consider King Abdallah as an 
important partner in establishing a security environment in the eastern Mediterranean 
region. Jordan has for geostrategic reasons strong international as well as regional 
allies and the EU is definitely also interested in keeping Jordan stable and (relatively) 
secure. And, as mentioned by Curtis Ryan: “Jordanian foreign relations are as vital to 
the kingdom’s domestic stability as they are to its regional and external security” 
(Ryan, 2014: 145). If the external security seems relatively strong, due to US, EU and 
Saudi Arabian support, the internal scene might be somewhat more vulnerable. Jordan 
has from the Parliamentary elections in November 2010, up to and after the latest 
elections in 2013 experienced unrest and frequent demonstrations, signaling that the 
Jordanian population is far from satisfied with their living conditions and with the 
regime. The demonstrations have been relatively small and if it hadn’t been for the 
external threat related to the ongoing war in Syria, the Jordanian regime might face 
further severe internal unrest. Under all circumstances it seems, as indicated by 
Valbjørn, that “the regime is facing growing pressure to deliver substantial reforms as 
few believe in the lofty reform rhetoric any longer” (Valbjørn, 2013: 316). 
The discussions related to the MP between the EU and Jordan have as mentioned 
touched upon issues of relevance for common security interests. In connection with 
that the tragic development in Syria plays an increasingly important role. According to 
the ENP implementation document quoted above 576.000 Syrian refugees were 
registered with the UNHCR in Jordan by the end of 2013 (EU-Commission, 2014d). 
Besides that, the realities in Jordan point at a development, where huge numbers of 
Syrians – outside the “official” context of the UNHCR – are being integrated in 
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Amman’s business life at many different levels, but especially at the level of unskilled 
work, where the Syrians substitute Egyptian and Asian guest workers.3 
The official Jordanian discourse speaks of the influx of Syrians, especially the 
refugees, as a huge economic burden for Jordan. It is very difficult to assess to which 
degree this is in accordance with the actual realities. In the context of this article it is 
important to emphasize that an influx of probably more than a million Syrians to a 
small country represent a significant task. The EU recognizes this and confirms 
furthermore the official Jordanian narrative (EU-Commission, 2014d). The EU 
documents do not challenge any of the official Jordanian viewpoints except for a few 
critical remarks on the electoral law, which notoriously still is democratically 
imperfect. Rather the policy shows the EU as a player in the Middle East, which 
pursues a pragmatic agenda in the MENA-region by supporting the Jordanian regime 
with significant economic means. The role of the MP in connection with the relation 
between the EU and Jordan seems to be a trade-off: Jordan gets the financial support 
from the EU and for that Jordan contributes to providing stability in the Levant. 
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Notes 
1
 CEPOL (European Police College) provides training of officers dealing with police work related to 
migration, hereunder surveillance, Eurojust (The European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit), EASO 
(European Asylum Support Office, an agency of the European Union that plays a key role in the concrete 
development of the Common European Asylum System) and the EFT (European Training Foundation, an 
EU agency that helps transition and developing countries to harness the potential of their human capital 
through the reform of education, training and labour market systems in the context of the EU's external 
relations). 
2
 Informal interviews by the author with EEAS-officials in Cairo. 
3
 This is based on personal observations and informal interviews in Jordan in 2013 and 2014. 
